affirmative duty to encourage and support athletic participation opportunities for women and those with disabilities. 10 An NGB's eligibility and participation criteria for U.S. athletes to participate in the Olympic, Paralympic, and Pan American Games must be consistent with those of the international federation ("IF") for its sport. 11 Athletes must be allowed to compete in international amateur athletic competitions unless the organization conducting the competition does not meet the applicable sanctioning criteria. 12 The Amateur Sports Act requires the USOC to establish a procedure for investigating and resolving complaints by athletes alleging that an NGB has violated these requirements, which adversely affects her or her eligibility to compete. 13 The Amateur Sports Act also mandates that the USOC establish a procedure for "swift and equitable resolution" of disputes "relating to the opportunity of an amateur athlete . . . to participate" in the Olympic, Paralympic, Pan-American Games, and world championship competitions (hereinafter "protected competitions"). 14 The USOC is required to hire an athlete ombudsman to provide independent advice to athletes (free of charge) regarding resolution of disputes regarding his or her eligibility to participate in these competitions. 15 Article IX of the USOC's Bylaws creates some important procedural and substantive rights for all athletes (including professional athletes) who meet the eligibility standards established by the NGB or Paralympic governing body for the sport in which he or she competes. 16 No member of the USOC, such as an NGB, "may deny or threaten to deny any amateur athlete the opportunity to participate" in a protected competition. 17 An NGB is required to provide fair notice and an internal hearing that provides an appropriate level of procedural due process before declaring an athlete ineligible to participate. 18 The USOC is required "by all reasonable means at its disposal" to "protect the right of an amateur athlete to participate if selected (or to attempt to qualify for selection to participate) as an athlete representing the United States" in any protected competition. 19 The USOC must conduct an investigation if an athlete alleges a denial of his or her participation rights by an NGB and promptly attempt to settle the matter. 20 The USOC's chief executive officer may also, in order to protect an athlete's rights, authorize legal action on the athlete's behalf or fund the athlete's legal action (including arbitration) against an NGB.
21
The Act gives an athlete the right to submit an eligibility dispute, if it is not resolved by the USOC to his or her satisfaction, to final and binding arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). 22 The athlete must submit a list of persons that he believes may be adversely affected by the arbitration (e.g., other athletes). 23 The AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules govern, with an expedited procedure available to ensure that a timely award that will "do justice to ___________ 10 . Id. §220524(6)-(7). 11. Id. §220522(a)(14). 12. Id. §220524(5). 13. Id. §220509(a). If the USOC finds that an NGB is not in compliance, it is authorized to place the NGB on probation or revoke its recognition. 14. Id. 15. Id. 36 U.S.C. §220509(b). John Ruger, a member of the 1980 U.S. Olympic biathlon team, currently serves as the USOC athlete ombudsman. 16 21. BYLAWS OF THE USOC, art. IX, § 9.9. However, the CEO's decision whether or not to do so "shall not be construed as an opinion of the [USOC] with respect to the merits of the athlete's claim." Id.
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Id. See also 36 U.S.C. §220522(a)(4)(B) (as a condition of being recognized as an NGB, it must agree to submit to binding arbitration in any dispute regarding an amateur athlete's opportunity to participate in a competition). 23. BYLAWS OF THE USOC, art. IX, § 9.3. This provision was added after the conclusion of multiple arbitration proceedings and subsequent litigation in Lindland, which illustrates the need for all affected athletes to have a fair opportunity to be heard in a single arbitration. Lindland v. USA Wrestling Ass'n, 227 F.3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 2000).
the affected parties" can be made. 24 The dispute, which is an arbitration proceeding between the athlete and the NGB (the USOC receives notice but generally is not a party), is resolved by a single impartial arbitrator or panel of arbitrators selected by the AAA (usually an attorney, retired judge, or other individual familiar with the particular sport). 25 The AAA panel's review is de novo, and the award must include the arbitrators' findings of fact and conclusions of law. 26 Because the AAA is bound by confidentiality obligations, historically it has not publicly released Article IX arbitration awards. Some recent Article IX arbitration awards obtained from sources other than the AAA 27 illustrate that arbitration panels have required that: 1) athletes have a fair opportunity to qualify for protected competitions; 28 and 2) an NGB's selection procedures must be fair, reasonable, and consistently applied to all athletes. 29 But otherwise, no general conclusions can be drawn regarding whether the AAA arbitration process effectively protects athletes' participation opportunities.
A court will provide only limited scrutiny of an AAA arbitration award affecting an athlete's eligibility to participate in a sport, which is subject to review and enforcement under the Federal Arbitration Act. 30 In Gault v. United States Bobsled and Skeleton Federation, a New York appellate court explained: "[a]lthough we also may disagree with the arbitrator's award and find most unfortunate the increasing frequency with which sporting events are resolved in the courtroom, we have no authority to upset it when the arbitrator did not exceed his authority."
31 However, a court will vacate or refuse to confirm an arbitration award that is "the result of 'corruption,' 'fraud,' 'evident partiality,' or any similar bar to confirmation." 
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Id. The arbitrator has no authority to review "the final decision of a referee during a competition regarding a field of play decision," which may determine or materially influence whether an athlete is selected to participate in a protected competition, unless it was outside the referee's authority to make or was "the product of fraud, corruption, partiality, or other misconduct." BYLAWS OF THE USOC, art. 9.5. 27. Copies of these awards are on file with Professor Mitten. 28. In the Matter of Arbitration between Sean Wolf and U.S. Rowing Association, Case No. 30 190 00635 02 (AAA, August 9, 2002) (finding that the NGB had granted a waiver to another rower who was unable to participate in one of the National Selection Regattas because he was taking a law school exam, the arbitrator ruled that the NGB improperly refused to grant claimant a waiver for a similar reason The Amateur Sports Act, which requires that all amateur athletes be given an equal opportunity to participate in protected competitions without discrimination, does not expressly nullify or supersede any applicable federal civil rights statutes that protect Olympic sport athletes against prohibited disability, 38 gender, 39 race, 40 and religious discrimination. 41 Courts are reluctant to grant any injunctive relief that interferes with the USOC's exclusive jurisdiction regarding athlete eligibility to participate in the Olympics or other protected competitions, 42 although an award of damages against the USOC or an NGB is an available remedy for violating an athlete's civil rights.
Except for a breach of contract action to require the USOC or an NBG to follow its own internal dispute resolution rules and procedures, 43 courts have ruled that the Amateur Sports Act bars state law claims by athletes arising out of eligibility disputes regarding protected competitions.
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American judges recognize the need for a uniform national procedure for resolving athlete eligibility issues, which is necessary to further Congress' "grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the USOC over all matters pertaining ___________ 33. In 1998, the original Amateur Sports Act was renamed the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act and, inter alia, amended to expressly provide that, although the USOC may sue and be sued in federal court, nothing in the Act "shall create a private right of action." 36 U.S.C. §220505(b) (9 Supp .2d at 1260, n.2. As one court observed, although the Stevens Act requires the USOC and its NGBs to submit unresolved eligibility disputes to binding arbitration, the statute does not require an athlete to do so. Sternberg, 123 F. Supp. at 666. Although a court must give effect to both the Amateur Sports Act and a federal civil rights statute if they can be reconciled, judicial application of a federal civil rights law to resolve the merits of an eligibility dispute would conflict with the Stevens Act's grant of exclusive authority to the USOC in such matters. Arbitration, not judicial intervention, is the best means of finally resolving the merits of all athlete eligibility disputes in a timely and efficient manner. to United States participation in the Olympic Games." 45 Thus, the Amateur Sports Act limits the nature and scope of judicial authority in athlete eligibility disputes and "only a very specific claim will avoid the impediment to [a court's] subject matter jurisdiction" established by this federal law. 46 In summary, courts have a very limited role in resolving athlete eligibility disputes. Although a court will not resolve the merits of the dispute, it will ensure that the USOC and NGBs follow their own rules and provide an athlete with the procedural due process protections required by the Amateur Sports Act and the USOC Bylaws. A court also will provide limited scrutiny of an Article IX arbitration award to ensure that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority and that it is not the product of corruption or bias.
B.
Professional Sports
Professional team and individual performer sports are a very popular form of entertainment in the United States. The producers of professional sporting events such as sports leagues and other organizations have strong market incentives to create a brand of athletic competition that attracts elite, highly skilled athletes, is commercially appealing to the public, and is profitable. Major professional team sports such as the National Football League ("NFL"), Major League Baseball ("MLB"), National Basketball Association ("NBA"), and National Hockey League ("NHL") as well as individual performer professional sports such as golf and tennis collectively attract millions of event attendees and viewers and generate billions of dollars in revenues annually. For most professional athletes, playing a sport is their primary occupation and source of income. In team sports, professional athletes generally are employees of their respective clubs who are paid an agreed salary, which typically is a substantial sum for NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL players. 47 Professional athletes who participate in individual performer sports such as golf and tennis usually are independent contractors who must satisfy the event organizer's qualifying criteria in order to participate in organized competitions. Their compensation is based on their respective individual performances in competitions.
In professional sports, the legal framework establishing the parameters of permissible athlete eligibility requirements and protecting an athlete's opportunity to participate is a mix of contract, labor, antitrust, and civil rights laws. In general, the legal relationship between a producer of professional sports competition and an athlete is established by the terms of their contract, with state contract law and federal labor, antitrust, and civil rights law governing its parameters. United States professional sports ___________ 45. Id. at 594. 46. Id. at 595. In Harding, a federal district court held that judicial intervention in athlete eligibility disputes: "is appropriate only in the most extraordinary circumstances, where the association has clearly breached its own rules, that breach will imminently result in serious and irreparable harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has exhausted all internal remedies. Even then, injunctive relief is limited to correcting the breach of the rules. The court should not intervene in the merits of the underlying dispute." Harding, 851 F. Supp. at 1478 (emphasis original). The Amateur Sports Act, in relevant part, provides: "In any lawsuit relating to the resolution of a dispute involving the opportunity of an amateur athlete to participate in the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games, or the Pan-American Games, a court shall not grant injunctive relief against [the USOC] within 21 days before the beginning of such games if [the USOC], after consultation with the chair of the Athletes' Advisory Council, has provided a sworn statement in writing . . . to such court that its constitution and bylaws cannot provide for the resolution of such dispute prior to the beginning of such games." 36 U.S.C. §220509 (a). As one court observed, this statutory provision "is designed to prevent a court from usurping the USOC's powers when time is too short for its own dispute-resolution machinery to do its work. Professional athletes have no athletic participation "rights" absent those established by contract. There is no federal law comparable to the Amateur Sports Act (which governs Olympic sports) that directly regulates professional sports leagues and governing bodies and protects professional athletes. However, professional athletes are covered by the federal civil rights statutes, which prohibit discrimination based on "race, color, or national origin." 51 Federal labor law enables a players' union to negotiate collectively bargained contractual provisions that define and protect unionized professional athletes' athletic participation opportunities as well as athlete eligibility dispute resolution procedures. In the major United States professional sports leagues (e.g., Major League Baseball, National Basketball Association, National Hockey Leagues, National Football League, and Major League Soccer), players unions represent athletes and possess exclusive authority to negotiate on behalf of athletes over terms and conditions of employment, including eligibility rules and grievance procedures. Through the collective bargaining process, unionized professional team sport athletes have the ability to negotiate initial eligibility requirements, limits on league and club disciplinary authority, and a dispute resolution process that adequately protects their athletic participation interests. Similar to the process for resolving eligibility disputes involving Olympic athletes, de novo arbitration before independent arbitrators with specialized sports law expertise often is used to resolve athlete eligibility disputes arising in unionized professional team sports.
By contrast, individual performer sport athletes are unable to engage in arms-length negotiation of eligibility requirements. However, the sport's independent promoter or governing body has a strong profit motive to produce a commercially viable form of athletic competition attractive to sports fans, which provides an economic incentive not to unduly restrict athletic participation opportunities.
C. High School and College Sports
In the U.S. more than 7 million boys and girls participate in high school sports, and approximately 400,000 participate in intercollegiate sports sponsored by universities that are members of the National Collegiate Athletic Association. Athlete eligibility rules are adopted, interpreted, and enforced by a state governing body for interscholastic athletics or a national association for intercollegiate athletics (e.g., the NCAA), which is comprised of their respective member educational institutions. Each high school and university also frequently has its own athlete eligibility rules and requirements. ___________ In contrast to athletes who participate in Olympic sports, high school and college athletes do not have direct representation on these governing bodies or a vote regarding athlete eligibility rules. 52 Unlike professional sport athletes, no union represents the interests of high school or college athletes 53 or collectively bargains for eligibility rules or an eligibility dispute resolution process (e.g., arbitration) on their behalf. Similar to the well-known "Golden Rule" in business and politics, high school and college sports governing bodies have the "gold," which provides broad and exclusive authority to adopt, interpret, and enforce athlete eligibility "rules" subject only to applicable legal constraints.
No federal law provides a legal framework for directly regulating high school or college sports [i.e., no ASA], and there is no government entity charged with a legal duty to protect student-athletes' sports participation opportunities. There is no federal (or state) constitutional law right to participate in either interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics, 54 and courts rarely find that athlete eligibility rules or their application in individual cases violate the U.S. Constitution or any state constitution.
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Courts also have uniformly rejected antitrust challenges to NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules, thereby creating a body of federal antitrust law jurisprudence holding that these rules are essentially per se legal.
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Although high school and college sports are offered because of their inherent educational benefits to student-athletes, 57 American courts almost uniformly refuse to recognize a legally protected interest in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletic participation (which is the means to the end of achieving these benefits) absent a valid contractual right to play a sport. Unless a governing body or educational institution violates federal or state civil rights laws by promulgating and/or applying eligibility rules that deny a high school or college student-athlete an opportunity to participate in sports based on race, color, national origin, gender, or learning or physical disability 58 courts generally refuse to apply anything ___________ 52 . As one court observed: "as a student, Carlberg has not voluntarily subjected himself to the rules of the [state high school athletic association]; he has no voice in its rules or leadership. We note as well the relatively short span of time a student spends in high school compared to the amount of time often required for institutional policies to change. These factors all point to the propriety of judicial scrutiny of [state high school athletic association] decisions with respect to student challenges." Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Ind. 1997). The same is essentially true for college athletes. Gulf So. Conference v. Boyd, 369 So.2d 553, 558 (Ala. 1979) ("The individual athlete has no voice or participation in the formulation or interpretation of these rules and regulations governing his scholarship, even though these materially control his conduct on and off the field. Thus in some circumstances the college athlete may be placed in an unequal bargaining position."). 53 57. Competing in athletics in interscholastic and/or intercollegiate athletics provides a unique educational experience with a significant potential to positively shape several aspects of a student-athlete's academic, personal, and professional life. Some of the most important traits and skills developed from competing in athletics are motivation, self-esteem, a strong work ethic, discipline, and the ability to work in a team environment, all of which are important factors in determining one's academic and career success. There is no federal (or state) constitutional law right to participate in either interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics... more than very limited rational basis scrutiny. 59 In other words, the athlete almost always loses because the rational basis test is an easy standard for a sports governing body to satisfy in most eligibility disputes.
Student-athletes rendered ineligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics may assert federal denial of due process claims against public colleges and universities, which are "state actors" subject to the constraints of the U.S. Constitution. 60 The Due Process Clause protects only property and liberty interests. 61 Courts generally refuse to recognize a constitutionally protected property interest in intercollegiate athletic competition and reject arguments that such participation is necessary to develop the skills necessary for a future professional sports career. 62 Although many college athletes aspire to a professional career, few achieve their dreams and such aspirations are considered speculative and not subject to constitutional protection. 63 Courts do recognize a student-athlete's property interest in the economic value of his or her athletic scholarship, which constitutes a renewable one-year contract with his or her university. 64 However, an athletic scholarship itself does not create a constitutionally protected property right to participate in intercollegiate sports. 65 As is true at the intercollegiate level, the prevailing judicial view is that participation in interscholastic athletics is not a federally protected property right or liberty interest. 66 However, this majority view is ironic because the Supreme Court has recognized that high students have a legally protected interest in "attending and participating in extracurricular activities as part of a complete educational experience," such as school-sponsored athletic events. 67 Nevertheless, absent violation of some independent fundamental constitutional right such as freedom of religion or speech, a high school athletic association or school rule or decision rendering a student-athlete ineligible to participate in interscholastic sports probably does not violate the federal constitution. 68 Courts often fail to recognize the important-perhaps unique-educational benefits and skills development derived from participation in interscholastic athletics (e.g., teamwork, discipline, perseverance, dealing with success and failure, etc.), which generally have many positive effects on a student's future personal life and career. The prevailing judicial approach, which is to accord substantial ___________ deference to state high school athletic associations and educational institutions regardless of the adverse effects on students who are deemed ineligible to participate in interscholastic athletics, reflects the judiciary's strong desire to avoid interfering with and micromanaging the high school educational process. 69 In a forthcoming article Professor Timothy Davis and I have proposed that a high school or college athlete should be denied an opportunity to participate in a sport only if doing so actually furthers a legitimate objective of the governing body or a school such as ensuring academic integrity, maintaining competitive balance and fair play, or promoting appropriate standards of conduct.
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In summary, United States law does not establish any constitutionally protected or fundamental right to participate in sports. Nevertheless, Olympic and professional athletes are provided a means to seek independent de novo review of eligibility decisions, usually through a system of private arbitration. In contrast, despite the significant benefits of participation in intercollegiate or interscholastic sports competition, U.S. courts almost uniformly refuse to recognize a legally protected interest in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletic participation or apply more than very limited rational basis scrutiny of student-athlete eligibility determinations unless there is exclusion or discrimination prohibited on constitutional or statutory grounds. ___________ 3 Rodriguez, who is one of only two current Hispanic head football coaches in the NCAA, 4 was one of the most successful coaches in WVU history with a 60-26 overall record. 5 He ___________ 11 It increased his compensation, 12 extended the term of his employment to January 15, 2014, and increased the amount of liquidated damages for prematurely terminating his contract. 13 The Second Amendment provided as follows: of University to any further payment from Coach. All sums required to be paid. by Coach to the University under this Section within two years shall be payable according to the following schedule: one-third due (30) days after termination; one-third due on the one year anniversary of termination; and one-third due on the second anniversary of termination.
INTRODUCTION
14 Before breaking his agreement with WVU, and without the prior knowledge or consent of the university, Rodriguez allegedly engaged in discussions with the University of Michigan regarding their head football coach position employment. 15 As a result of this conduct, West Virginia sued Rodriguez after he accepted the Michigan job. 16 WVU asked the court to find that Rodriguez's contract with WVU was valid, that WVU had not breached that contract, that Rodriguez had breached it by taking the Michigan job, and that he failed to pay the first installment of the $4 million in liquidated damages he owed to WVU by virtue of his early termination of the Employment Agreement. 17 Initially the parties disputed whether the case should be decided in Michigan or West Virginia. Rodriguez argued that the proper venue for the dispute was in Michigan because he was a domiciled resident of the state prior to the original filing of the lawsuit. WVU ultimately prevailed on this issue as the West Virginia federal court remanded the matter to the West Virginia circuit court. 18 In defense, Rodriguez argued that in August of 2007, just prior to the football season, pressure was put on him to execute the Second Amendment to the Employment Agreement. He claimed that the following promises were made in order to induce him to execute the Second Amendment: a.
That the major donors to the Athletic Department at WVU insisted upon a $4,000,000.00 penalty clause in the event that Rodriguez left the employ of WVU. b.
That he would be given additional monies to pay assistant coaches more money for salary increases. c.
That he would be given a website to promote the athletic program. d.
That the students under the athletic program would not be required to return their books at the end of the semester season as was the current practice at that time. e.
That monies would be made available for the Puskar Center renovation to increase the viability of the football program being coached by Rodriguez. f.
That Michael Garrison, the incoming President of WVU, indicated that if Rodriguez wanted to leave "the lawyers would get together and reduce the cost of the buyout to $2,000,000.00." 19 Later in January, Rodriguez posted a $1.5 million letter of credit with the court which he described as a "gesture of good faith." 22 The letter of credit was designed to secure any payments up to $1.5 million that the court might order him to pay. He argued that $1.5 million was the maximum amount of damages that WVU might be entitled under the terms of his employment agreement.
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On July 9, 2008, Rodriguez and WVU agreed to settle the lawsuit. WVU will receive $4 million. $2.5 million will come from the University of Michigan's Athletic Department using funds from its reserves (annual surpluses from sponsorships, licenses and media rights payments). The University also agreed to pay Rodriguez's legal fees. 24 Rodriguez is responsible for the remaining $1.5 million, which will be paid in three annual payments of $500,000 beginning January 10, 2010. Under the terms of the settlement Rodriguez is not required to pay any interest that accrued on the buyout triggered by his departure. 25 In an editorial in the Ann Arbor News on July 13, 2008, the University of Michigan was severely criticized for the payment of Rodriguez's buyout.
If anyone is under the illusion that Michigan football is part of the universe of public education, get over it. That's a quaint notion, but college sports at this level is big business: a farm system for the pros, a money-making enterprise with multimillion-dollar endorsement deals and TV rights, an engine to woo and garner major alumni donations. 26 Oddly enough, Rodriguez's new contract with the University of Michigan also contains a liquidated damage provision in the event of an early departure. 27 Rodriguez agreed to pay the University of Michigan $4 million if he terminates his contract in year one. The buyout amount decreases by $500,000 each contract year. The contract term is 6 years, from January 2, 2008 to December 31, 2013.
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WVU's new head football coach Bill Stewart executed an Employment Agreement on September 10, 2008 . 29 In the event that Stewart terminates his Employment Agreement to take a position in any capacity with a football program at another Division 1 school or a professional football team, he is required to pay WVU liquidated damages in the amount of $1 million. 30 Under a Covenant Not to Compete clause, if Stewart leaves WVU for another Division 1 or professional job, he cannot in the next year "personally contact or otherwise seek to recruit any high school student or transfer a prospective student athlete previously contacted or recruited by the University." 31 Interestingly, at the time of Rodriguez's resignation, it was also alleged that he was recruiting current Ohio State quarterback Terrelle Pryor and that he told Pryor of his move to Michigan before telling West Virginia. Allegedly he also attempted to recruit a handful of WVU prospects including WVU offensive ___________ guard Josh Jenkins, to join him at Michigan. Cell phone records showed that he used his WVU cell phone to contact recruits and then took records pertaining to these communication and other documents related to his employment at WVU when he moved out of his office.
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Stewart's contract language seeks to prevent this type of activity. Upon the termination of the contract by either Stewart or WVU, Stewart is obligated to give WVU "all materials or articles or information, including without limitation, keys, keycards, cell phones, computers, equipment, parking passes, automobiles, personal records, recruiting records, team information, video, statistics or other material documents, correspondence or other data furnished to the coach by the University or developed by the coach."
33

TYPES OF BUY OUTS
Buyouts or back-end agreed-to liquidated damages for early termination by coaches have become popular for universities in the last several years as a deterrent to prevent coaches from leaving. Because a university's judicial remedies are limited to a negative injunction; that is, preventing the coach from working for another employer during the term of an existing contract, back-end agreed-to liquidated damages helps a school prevent a coach from jumping, allows the school to preserve its reputation, and provides it with agreed upon monetary damages in the event of an early termination.
Buyouts take a number of forms. Other coaches' contracts contain a specific buyout number regardless of when they leave. For instance:
• Louisiana State University (LSU) coach Les Miles could owe the university $500,000 in the event of his early termination; however, if Miles accepts employment at the University of Michigan he is required to pay LSU $1.2 million for early termination.
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• If Ohio State University's coach Jim Tressl prematurely terminates his contract he has to pay $500,000 to reimburse Ohio State for expenses "including, but not limited to (i) searching for, recruiting, and hiring a new head football coach and coaching staff, (ii) relocating a new head football coach and coaching staff, and (iii) buying out the contract, if necessary, of the new head coach." In addition, Tressl agrees to reimburse Ohio State for all amounts Ohio State is contractually required to pay coaches, coaching staff if the new head coach does not recommend employment of coaching staff. 40 ___________ employment during the term of this Agreement without first obtaining the written consent of the president of the University. Such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld." 46 The second clause, found in Article IX, stated that if Brown left Northeastern prior to the end of the contract period, then he "shall pay to the University as liquidated damages $ 25,000" and if the university accepted that amount, it would be deemed to be "adequate and reasonable compensation to the University." 47 According to the court, the liquidated damages clause in Article IX did not limit the university's remedies to mere acceptance of liquidated damages. 48 Instead, the court construed the contract to mean that if the university accepted the liquidated damages, the coach was free to leave; however, the university could exercise and did not waive other remedies, including injunctive relief. 49 As a result of this case, to protect the coach when drafting similar liquidated damage clauses, there must be a clear statement that if the coach decides to prematurely terminate his contract, pursuant to the liquidated damages provision, the university must accept the amount of liquidated damages as its sole and exclusive remedy and waives or has no further right to any alternative remedies, including injunctive or other equitable relief.
The Brown court also indicated that Article VIII had precedence over the liquidated damages clause and, in effect, the university could trump a buyout by not consenting to or approving other employment.
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As a result, contract drafters should include further protective language indicating that if the coach desires to terminate early and pay liquidated damages pursuant to the Employment Agreement, provisions similar to those found in Article VIII of Brown's contract, should not have the legal effect of negating or having precedence over the liquidated damages clause.
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TAX CONSIDERATIONS
Oftentimes these buyout fees are actually paid for by the new employer and/or the new employer reimburses the coach. An interesting article analyzing the tax consequences of such buyouts recently appeared in the Florida Tax Review. 52 According to the authors, "[i]t makes no difference whether the employer makes the buyout payment directly or reimburses the employee for making it since the substance of these two circumstances are identical, i.e. it will be treated as a payment by the employee." 53 Most likely the buyout will be considered to be a personal obligation of the coach and the Internal Revenue Service will contend that "the new employer's payment of the buyout obligation is additional compensation to the employee and taxable to him." 54 Still, the payment of a buyout fee may be ___________ Buyouts or back-end agreed-to liquidated damages for early termination by coaches have become popular among universities in the last several years as a deterrent to prevent coaches from leaving deductible as a business expense for the coach. 55 However, if the payment were fully deductible by the coach then it would not matter whether the employer's payment or reimbursement constitutes income taxable to the coach as this income would be totally offset by the deduction allowed. Rodriguez acknowledges that as of the date of execution of this Agreement, the University has paid the sum of $2,500,000 to West Virginia University ("WVU") pursuant to the terms of that certain settlement agreement by and among Rodriguez, WVU and the University dated July 31, 2008 (the "Settlement Payment"). The University considers this payment as taxable wages for tax withholding and reporting purposes. Consistent with that determination, the University has made timely deposits with appropriate taxing authorities of all amounts required to be withheld as taxes with respect to Rodriguez as a result of making the Settlement Payment (the "Withheld Taxes"). The University has agreed to neutralize the actual tax impact of the Settlement Payment to Rodriguez, in order that Rodriguez not be unduly burdened or distracted in connection with the performance of his duties hereunder. It is the express intention of the parties that neither party benefit financially to the extent that there is a difference between (i) the amount of the Withheld Taxes, and (ii) the amount of the tax liability incurred by Rodriguez (after claiming all deductions allowable under applicable tax laws) which is attributable to the University having made the Settlement Payment. Therefore, as soon as practicable in 2009, the parties will review Rodriguez's pertinent 2008 tax information, and Rodriguez will pay the University, or the University will pay Rodriguez, as the case may be, such amount as is necessary to effectuate this mutually desired result.
58
CONCLUSION
The situation involving Rich Rodriguez should serve as a warning for a university with a high profile coach or one who is perceived as a rising star. A liquidated damages clause may provide the jilted university with some monetary relief if a coach leaves before his contract expires, but, it will not prevent the loss of the coach's services. In the end, although the university may receive some sort of compensation, nothing can force a coach to stay. 
